By applying Alasdair MacIntyre' s framework o f rival traditions o f rationality analogically to Catholic theologians and economists, this paper argues that these two groups can greatly benefit from a reexamination and appropriation o f John A . Ryan' s insights when engaging debate on wage justice today, first by understanding the tradition out ofwhich the Catholic Church established its rationale fo r justice regarding wages, and second by applying Ryan' s innovation o f six "canons o f distributive justice" fo r establishing commensurability o f concepts in discourse between the traditions o f moral theology and economic science. This paper argues that Ryan' s distinctive experience and character allowed him to enter into conversation with a non native tradition o f enquiry to draw forth commensurate concepts that improved the coherence o f his native Catholic theological understanding and afforded greater opportunities to discourse with social scientists in meaningful argument fo r the sake o f human welfare.

AMERICA, R Y A N , A N D T H E L I V I N G W A G E -T H E N
O n an exploratory trip to the American Catholic History Research Cen ter and University Archives at The Catholic University o f America, I rummaged through clippings from newspapers and magazines that the Rt. Rev. John A. Ryan had ostensibly kept for further reflection, research, or comment. Among the hundreds, one which caught my particular attention was a March 22, 1930, article from America magazine entitled "The Lim ited-Price Chain Stores," in which Paul Blakely, S.J., criticized the failure o f store owners to pay a "living wage" despite significant increases in rev enue and profits sustained over a period o f years. Images o f 1930s 5-and 10-cent stores juxtaposed themselves in my mind with those o f twentyfirst-century Walmart stores. Given the urgency o f Blakely's call for wage justice in his time o f grave economic insecurity then, I had to ask myself, in a time o f economic uncertainty now, "W hat advances have we made toward 'economic justice for all?' W hat does 'justice' mean to us today?"
Debates over wage justice in the United States today continue to cen ter heavily around the pros and cons o f minimum wage legislation, and even among Catholics, there is much disagreement over what constitutes just wage levels and whether it is within the state's competency or inter est to rule on and mandate those wages of employers for their contracted employees. In today's liberal society, justice seems to be commensurate with the free entrance into and obligation to follow through on contracts bargained by parties outside o f conditions o f coercion.1 At the same time, appeals to teleological reasoning in Catholic social teaching want to re quire more o f justice in serving both greater personal and social ends that fulfill criteria for integral human development and flourishing. Thinking about the parallels between the context and challenges o f John A. Ryan's times and the present, I argue that there is merit in revisiting his work and investigating the ways in which his conceptual frame for understanding distributive justice can be illuminative for understanding what is proposed by competing claims for justice in economic relationships in our times.
As a method for proving the value o f Ryan's contribution to this en deavor I will argue that Alasdair M acIntyre's work on contested traditions o f rationality and justice elaborated in Whose Justice? Which Rationality is o f great use here.2 As theologians and economists adhere to different traditions o f enquiry with their own distinctive criteria for rational judg ment, any engagement between these traditions requires some ground for translatability o f their beliefs and values for intelligible discourse and self critique. I posit that John A. Ryan's deep understanding o f distributive ju s tice comprehensively attends to and translates prevailing criteria o f justice arising both out o f Catholic theology and economic science through the enumeration o f six "principal canons o f distributive justice." By utilizing the framework Ryan bequeaths to us in his precise canons when making arguments for justice, particularly that o f wage justice in Ryan's thought, theologians and economists can appreciate the goals and limits of wage justice in prescriptions to policymakers.
Catholic bishops, theologians, and economists are greatly indebted to Ryan and his conceptual framework, but all too often they use his ideas without the same precision and deliberate attention to the exigencies o f what he meant when he spoke o f justice. In building contemporary argu ments for economic justice in American society, the thought o f John A. Ryan might be faithfully renovated so that it yet may serve to frame dis course on relevant, productive programs for human welfare.
CANONIZING RELEVANT TERMS IN RIVAL TRADITIONS
Among the many contributions that Ryan made to the growing social doc trine o f the Catholic Church, perhaps his greatest was the definition and distinction among relevant terms used in arguments surrounding econom ic justice. As the product of the reigning Neo-Scholastic method of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ryan never lost touch with the deepest roots of the Catholic philosophical and theological tradition. At the same tim e, however, he was known to admire the social gospelers, even if he did not share their ingenuous optimism (Gaillardetz 1990: 109-10) . In an effort to be both comprehensive and relevant to the con cerns and challenges o f his day, he staked out a kind o f via media between the individualist and collectivist currents of his day through the synthesis o f classical theological authorities and modern English, German, French, and American social scientists (Broderick 1963: 91 and "it deals only with those incomes that are derived from participation in production" (Ryan 1942a: 3) .5 Eschewing the potential quagmire o f grappling with the redistribu tion o f private property, Ryan turns more directly for the remainder o f his study to the problem o f distributive justice surrounding incomes, as he states in the final sentence o f his introduction to Distributive Justice:
"Where the factors o f production are owned by distinct groups o f persons, the problem is to determine whether each group is properly remunerated for the function it has performed" (Ryan 1942a: 5-6) . The determination o f what constitutes proper remuneration is for him the purview not o f a commutative, contractual justice, but rather o f distributive justice. As an aid to his arguments, particularly as it affects the incomes o f businessmen and their wage-earning laborers, he introduces six canons, or "chief rules ofjustice that have been or might be adopted in distributing the product o f industry among those who participate actively in the productive process" (Ryan 1942a: 180) . He raises the discussion in section three o f Distribu tive Justice on the moral aspect o f profits because o f the important bearing which the profits o f businessmen will have on the wages o f the laborers in their employ. Ryan's vision o f wages is roundly personal and social, tak ing into account a myriad o f relationships between the worker and various other persons and social groups that go beyond that o f his relationship to his employer. A t the same time, however, in the enumeration o f his six canons, he adverts to aporias and incoherencies in his moral theological tradition ofjustice that insufficiently grapple with physical and social facts that limit the practicability o f certain canons as guides for policies in his day and age.
The first canon o f distributive justice is the canon o f equality, which abides by rules o f arithmetical equality such that any person who contrib utes anything at all to the production o f a good or service should receive an equal portion o f its benefits. Although appealing to justice on the basis o f "equality," the kind o f equality provided in this canon is commensurate only to the human dignity o f each o f the agents involved, not to the human welfare o f each. To treat all agents equally in the distribution o f benefits would do injustice to all, as economic productivity is production o f exter nal goods according to the result o f factors including human capacities, skills, and efforts. The distribution o f those material products equally is also not necessarily congruent with each individual's needs. Because hu man beings are material, emotional, and spiritual complexes that cannot be comprehensively given their due through arithmetical, material equality alone, the first canon is an insufficient rule for distributive justice. The second canon is based on needs and would account for apportion ing economic goods based on the capacity o f the recipient to use those goods. Ryan notes that this rule would be "ideal" if distribution were entirely independent o f the process o f production (Ryan 1942a: 181) . It would treat unequals-in the respects in which they were unequal-in accordance with the proper proportion to which each is due according to the potential to use what is received well. However, when accounting for the moral claims o f the producer rather than the recipient o f the goods al located, recognizing the varying degrees to which effort and sacrifices are made by the productive agent, needs alone are insufficient for making a fair distribution, yet still more nuanced than the pure arithmetical equality o f the first canon. Along with the first canon, Ryan warns o f not only the ethical incompleteness o f this canon, but the social impracticability and impossibility, where such a distribution would injure social welfare in the long run. Third, the canon o f efforts and sacrifices would ideally be just if one ignored the former canon o f need and the following canon o f productivity. This rule rewards the agent's moral character as applied to provision o f his or her factor o f production, but does not account for the differing needs o f each agent's human welfare, as well as the absolute amount o f product his or her efforts render. Taken together, the first three canons are "formally ethical, inasmuch as they are directly based upon the dignity and claims o f personality" in each agent/recipient (Ryan 1942a: 183) . Necessary as each is in its own sphere o f concern, together they must be supplemented by canons that attend not only to ethics, but to the economic and social reali ties through which they are realized. Before turning to the fourth and fifth canons, which Ryan identifies as "primarily physical and social" (Ryan 1942a: 183) , it may be helpful to take stock o f what has been presented in these first three canons, which he identifies as having a "formally ethical" character. First, from Ryan's perspective, arising out o f the Catholic tradition o f Thomism, the three canons o f equality, needs, and efforts/sacrifices address what are account ed for otherwise in earlier traditional moral authorities. Second, however, Ryan notes the insufficiency o f these canons in his native tradition to deal with the practical and real social and material limits o f the communities in which they are to be applied. Ryan is forced, by engaging with the rival tradition o f economics, to confirm or disconfirm his initial views, drawn from his own tradition, in light o f those o f the rival tradition, "placing [himself] imaginatively within the scheme o f belief inhabited by those whose allegiance is to the rival tradition, so as to perceive and conceive the natural and social worlds as they perceive and conceive them " (MacIntyre 1989: 394-95) . Thus, one can conceive o f the next two canons o f dis tributive justice as the fruit o f Ryan's engagement with the rival tradition to render his own tradition, that o f properly moral enquiry, more coher ent and practically rational under the existing framework inherited from Thomism and his contemporary Catholic magisterial deposit.
The fourth and fifth canons concern productivity and scarcity re spectively, and as mentioned, are primarily rules derived from positive economic analysis. Productivity ignores moral claims o f need and effort, focusing solely on the quantitative result o f labor. In many ways, produc tivity is able to account, in part, for the third canon o f needs and sacrifice, as increased effort often returns increasing productivity to scale, on aver age, ceteris paribus. However, it ignores the advantage o f persons who have increased or diminished native capacities due only to accidental fac tors. Additionally, because o f the incommensurability o f valuing the par ticular products o f laborers, such as the road-builder, banker, and surgeon, even through the medium o f currency, it is practically impossible to assure comparative justice with regard to respective production. This follows as well for distribution based on scarcity, where the skills and access to avail able equipment often differentiate value without attention to an agent's moral desert. Although scarce employment is often attained through effort and sacrifice, like the opportunity cost o f foregone wages to pursue higher education or training, native capacities and accidents o f life play too great a role to base distribution on scarcity alone. Here, Ryan has attempted in his thoroughgoing analysis o f justice to enter into the conceptual imagination o f his non-native tradition, that o f economic science, to draw forth principles o f justice based on sufficient rationales commensurate, or translatable enough to render them commen surate, for meaningful discourse between these rival traditions. It is worth noting that Ryan does not discard the fourth and fifth canons arising out o f the economics as superfluous to the first three derived from his native theological/philosophical tradition, nor does he discount their value to a secondary or subordinate priority. They are deserving o f sincere regard as valid canons o f true justice. Though essentially insufficient in and o f themselves to render both a practicable and morally satisfactory account o f wage justice, they are essentially necessary for the construction o f the sixth, comprehensive canon o f justice which follows.
The sixth canon o f justice, human welfare, is the summation and syn thesis o f all that concerns the previous five canons, distributing according to that which promotes the well-being o f all persons considered individu ally as well as collectively. It is not to be synonymous with a collectivist notion o f total social, or merely aggregate, welfare, which is why he quali fies this type of welfare as "human." He further goes onto elaborate the fullness o f its individual aspect:
It requires that all human beings be treated as persons, as possessed of natural rights: this is equality. It demands that all industrial persons receive at least that amount of income which is necessary for a decent living and reasonable self-development: this is a recognition of needs. The canon of human welfare declares that some consideration must be accorded manifestations of good will by those who take part in the processes of industry: this is a recognition of efforts and sacrifices.
And it gives reasonable recognition to the canons of productivity and scarcity. (Ryan 1942a: 187-88) Seemingly compatible with economic definitions o f welfare noting the ad vantage o f a producer's investment in labor and capital to evoke maximum net product to the point where diminishing returns to scale set in, human welfare, with its ethical emphasis on the dignity o f the human person, becomes for Ryan the touchstone for any determination of distributive justice.
Ryan's definition o f distributive justice according to the sixth canon o f human welfare, though originally penned in 1916, greatly resembles the concept o f "social justice" elaborated in 1931 by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. Although he him self had no direct influ ence on the drafting o f the pope's letter, its addressing o f many o f Ryan's concerns in somewhat parallel language was seen as a vindication o f his thought by him self and his peers (Broderick 1963, 196) . The third edition o f Distributive Justice makes note o f the striking parallels between his and the pope's terms and concepts in an appended paragraph at the end o f chapter 14 on the six canons. Ryan admits:
Since the foregoing paragraphs first appeared, Pope Pius XI gave much attention and wide currency to the concept and the phrase social justice. It is a better and more accurate expression than "human welfare." Here is a statement of its function: Social justice impels both individuals and public officials to promote the common good; that is, the common welfare, taken distributively as well as collectively; the good of the community, not only as a unified entity, but as composed of social groups and individuals. (Ryan 1942a: 188) The principal canon o f distributive justice is what Pope Pius XI called in Quadragesimo Anno, n. 58, "the norms o f the common good"-social justice. Although Ryan was only able to add the precise language o f "so cial justice" in subsequent editions o f Distributive Justice, it should not be seen as ancillary or auxiliary, but rather the heart o f all discussions o f distributive justice, as his sixth canon redefined.
W hat then is gained by the use o f Ryan's canons o f distributive justice that is not already present in the foundational work o f thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas, the Catholic philosophical and theological tradition, and the work o f the social scientists? I contend that Ryan's ability as a figure seated in the traditional Catholic theological framework to take seriously and integrate the insights o f the rival tradition o f economic science into a comprehensive concept like "human welfare," or as Catholics prefer to day, "social justice," renders intelligible the insights o f economists into the practical possibility o f the achievement o f human welfare given the quaes-tiones facti that require a prudential decision on the quaestiones juris6 It is not that moral theologians are to compromise the commitments that they have to fundamental notions o f right canonized in the justice based on equality, needs, and efforts/sacrifice. Rather, it is critical that they are able to render intelligible to their own tradition the necessity o f limiting, for the present time given external circumstances, the pursuit o f fullness o f these moral canons ofjustice given the prudential just judgments o f the social and physical canons that may render attempts to fulfill the moral canons injurious to human welfare and the common good. At the same time, the engagement o f Ryan with his non-native tradition o f enquiry can help to explicate to those in the economic sciences the fundamental vision and commitment o f moral theologians and Catholic pastors to the moral canons that reflect the teleological understanding o f human persons and society that aim at the full realization o f human dignity in social and eco nomic relationships in the context o f their relationship with God.7
AMERICA, R Y A N , A N D T H E L I V I N G W A G E -N O W
Now, in 2015, over one hundred years after the publication o f Ryan's A Living Wage and ninety-nine years after Distributive Justice, America magazine once again was the locus o f another piece on the fight for a living wage. This time the article, written by the magazine's senior editor Kevin Clarke, directly addressed the February 19th announcement by Walmart that new employees will receive $9/hour beginning in April 2015 and $10/ hour in 2016, figures above many state and federal minimum wage lev els. Citing business analysts on the reasons for such a change after years o f resistance by corporate executives, Clarke notes that, "The new wage schedule should help with employee retention and would allow the com pany to unify wage standards that have become complicated by successful local and statewide campaigns to raise minimum wages around the coun try" (Clarke 2015) . There is a sense that W almart's executives, operating out o f canons o f productivity and scarcity, do not wish to see inefficiencies in business operations that would jeopardize the enterprise and the justice o f relationships for all who depend on Walmart for its products and labor, among other important factors. Citing Rev. Sinclair Oubre o f the Catholic Labor Network, as well, Clarke also notes that, "This very positive action should not distract [U.S. Catholics] from the larger goal, which is tw o fold . . . [that] employers have a responsibility to pay a living wage to employees, and we as consumers have a responsibility to be willing to pay a premium so that our fellow workers have a just wage" (Clarke 2015) . Here a broader vision invoking canons o f need and human welfare calls for further discourse to continue efforts by all members o f society, such as individuals and intermediate groups including unions, corporations, and the state as well, to work out preliminary just outcomes that are consonant with Catholic social teaching while grounded in the prudential judgment of economic realities that set the social and material limits of potential outcomes. Catholic economists providing relevant business analysis along with theologians and pastors attending to the anthropological and moral vision of the Church might work together to articulate better the rationale o f their tradition's wage "justice" in an article like this, through the use o f Ryan's six canons.
Near the end of his life, Ryan gave an address that was redacted in a short article for the Review o f Social Economy in which he set forth two objectives for Catholic economists. The first was to give a complete account o f economic phenomena, adding a moral evaluation o f practices described therein with possible remedies for bad practices. The second was the "formulation and support o f particular economic reforms and o f a general scheme o f social reconstruction" (Ryan 1942b: 4) . It is this second aim which can help guide the necessary further steps toward distributive economic justice today, guided by Ryan's painstaking, comprehensive ap proach that attends to both normative demands o f Catholic social teaching and the positive principles o f economic theory and its analytics. Catholic economists, in dialogue with Church leaders and moral theologians, have much to contribute, guiding the work o f the academy, business and labor institutions, and the government on this critical issue. Much o f Ryan's thought can be found in more contemporary documents, like the 1986 U.S. bishops' pastoral letter Economic Justice fo r All.8 However, a fuller recov ery o f his discrete terminology in the canons o f distributive justice applied to the vision o f Catholic social teaching can help update and adapt prin ciples by which Catholic economists and policymakers can engage techni cal problems facing the economy in conversation with Catholic bishops, theologians, and philosophers who, though members o f the same Church, are guided in their respective vocations by two rival traditions o f enquiry and rationality.
Solid portions o f both A Living Wage and Distributive Justice were
given over to the quantitative applications o f Ryan's ethical and economic commitments in theory. Here we see his attempt at the first objective he enjoined on Catholic economists. Clearly there were limits to the possibil ity o f wholesale adoption and application o f Ryan's work on economic justice both in his own time and now in the twenty-first century. First, and not unique to our present context alone, Ryan does not deal with the historical injustices that give rise to the disparity seen in the gross wealth inequality in the United States today. Although his approach to dealing with problems o f distributive justice through income alone does not re quire immediate, revolutionary redistribution o f wealth, but does promote a long-term redistribution through greater income equality over genera tions, one must ask, "W hat about those suffering now from the wealth disparity?" Many other thinkers engaged with Catholic social teaching do attend to that issue more directly and should be viewed as critical dia logue partners with proponents o f Ryan's approach.9 Second, despite his prescient understanding o f the evolving society and economy o f the twen tieth century, Ryan wrote in a context very different from the democratic, post-industrial, service-based economy o f the United States today and it must be noted clearly that he him self is neither a political nor economic liberal by any means.10 Nevertheless, there still is much to be drawn from his work and one can take inspiration and guidance from his prolific work. As Richard Gaillardetz concludes, "Ryan also anticipated the 'signs o f the tim es' theology in his conviction that the Church must enter into public discourse on a much broader range o f socio-economic issues and must be unafraid to make concrete proposals, defending them in terms to which all people o f good will might assent" (Gaillardetz 1990: 119) . He becomes the kind o f man MacIntyre sees as necessary in the face o f the failure o f the Enlightenment project, to "turn his or her own initial incoherencies to argumentative advantage by requiring o f each tradition that it supply an account o f how these incoherencies are best to be characterized, explained, and transcended" (MacIntyre 1989: 398) . By reclaiming and applying his canons o f distributive justice to contemporary theories o f income, Ryan brings the rationality o f properly moral concerns from one tradition to the attention and consideration o f the properly material and social concerns in positive economic analysis o f distribution, critically testing each for a new coherence and synthesis satisfactory to his Catholic tradition while seri ously noting the challenges o f the rival tradition o f liberalism. By reintro ducing the advocates o f Catholic social teaching to their fountainhead, one might instill in them, both theologians and economists alike, an apprecia tion for the utility o f social science in seeking moral ends. Neither a typical traditionalist nor combative revolutionary, John A. Ryan's deep commit ment to both his Catholic faith and American socio-economic develop ment grounded his hope that our nation could not only sustain a vibrant and productive economy, but also that such an economy would engender true distributive justice and a living wage for all. Capitalism and Freedom (1962) , and philosophers John Rawls, A Theory o f Jus tice (1981), and David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (1986) .
2. The inspiration taken from MacIntyre in the approach to closing the gap in understanding between Catholic theologians and economists is only an ana logical application of the framework he elaborated in chapters 19, "Tradition and Translatability," and 20, "Contested Justices, Contested Rationalities." The claim here is not that Catholic theologians are "Catholic" and economists "liberal," which is patently false. The merit of this analogy, however, lies in the intellectual formation and historical person of John A. Ryan himself, who though firmly in the Thomistic theological tradition acquired the "language-in-use" of a particular ri val tradition, that of economic science and was thus able to mediate the rationality of an alien "tradition of social science" to his native tradition of moral theology.
3. In the 1942 3rd edition of Distributive Justice, Ryan adverts to the use fulness of the term "social justice" in two particular places-first, in regard to arguments for and against the right of labor to the total value of industry produc tion (cf. pp. 96-99) and second, in regard to the naming of the sixth canon of distributive justice (cf. p. 188), the latter of which will be commented on later in this paper.
4. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica IIa-IIae, q. 58, a. 5-8; q. 61, a. 1-4; q.62, a. 1.
5. By setting the scope of his book Distributive Justice in its subtitle, "The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth," it seems odd that Ryan dismisses a thorough discussion of potential programs for wealth redistribution. In a way, Ryan did begin with this reassessment, but obliquely, by arguing a tra ditional position of private landownership and private property as "natural right." He very briefly raises the cases against private property leveled by Communists, Socialists, and Henry George's "Single Taxers," dismissing them in turn for either the inefficacy or impracticability of each of those ideal systems in the face of the nature of the human beings that inhabit them. Instead, Ryan appeals to his own tradition of natural right as the basis for private landownership, as he will for private capital. Enumerating three kinds of natural rights-1. rights to goods in themselves, 2. rights directly necessary as means to human welfare, and 3. rights indirectly necessary as a means to human welfare-Ryan places private property in the third category. Although not essential to personal identity and one's rela tionship to God and others, but because of the social institutions which human be ings have created, private property is a right to the presence and benefits of those institutions once established (Ryan 1942a: 48) .
6. The use of these terms quaestiones facti and quaestiones iuris is derived from Pius XII's address on religion in the community of nations Ci Riesce (1953) as he attempted to explain how the Catholic magisterium could hold to the moral and theological principles of religious establishment of true religion while admit ting the prudential tolerance of the evil of false beliefs for the sake of a greater good found in the common good and civil peace. 8. Explicitly drawing upon the 1919 Program of Social Reconstruction drafted by Ryan, the U.S. bishops included many of his concepts in their appeal to the nation at the end of the twentieth century. In it we find Ryan's commitment to the necessary establishment of a legislated baseline for wage justice through a minimum wage that is a living wage, restoring purchasing power to those at risk of poverty (NCCB 1986: n. 197 ). That commitment is founded on what the bishops call "basic justice"-whose three dimensions are commutative, distribu tive, and social justice-all accounted for in the six canons of Ryan's "distributive justice" (nn. 68-74). The bishops raise questions directed at the prevailing Ameri can economic system and its values that prioritize profits over human needs and dignity (n. 132). Finally, calls are made to bring "democratic ideals to economic life" in a new role for labor as partners in and with management (nn. 298-300).
9. Cf. James P. Bailey. Rethinking Poverty: Income, Assets, and the Catho lic Social Justice Tradition (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). In the very first chapter of his book, Bailey argues for a paradigm shift away from the emphasis on income to that of assets and wealth which more com prehensively captures the long-term causes and consequences of poverty and dis crimination in the United States.
10.
In an article by Harlan Beckley, the author concludes that due to both similarities and differences with later twentieth century liberal thinkers like Rawls or Gauthier, "Ryan could join American liberals, who had a quite different per spective, in advocating policies that increased the power of labor unions and the proportion of national income going to laborers. But it also explains why Ryan advocated state intervention to establish industrial democracy and the occupa tional group system and why he did not think justice requires policies to reduce all large profits." Ultimately Beckley concludes that Ryan's theory of justice as a whole is incompatible with that of egalitarian liberalism and that he himself cannot be placed in that tradition. Cf. Harlan R. Beckley, "The Legacy of John A. Ryan's Theory of Justice," American Journal o f Jurisprudence 33(1) (1988): 61 98. Available at http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol33/iss1/3. Accessed March 2, 2015.
